Open-mindedness and Normative Contingency

Tiberius, V. (2012). Open-mindedness and Normative Contingency Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 7, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau (Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 182-204.

Abstract: Open-mindedness seems to be a virtue because an open mind is more receptive to the truth. But if value judgments are best understood as a human projection, expression, or construction, then it is unclear why open-mindedness is a virtue when it comes to normative judgments. If moral truths are not “out there”, what is the point of an open mind? What are we being open to? Further, if oughts and values are, in some way, contingent on us, open-mindedness may put us at greater risk of losing important convictions than in the case of belief about the world. In this paper I defend open-mindedness for normative judgment in the context of meta-ethical theories that makes values mind-dependent.

Work on this paper was supported by a grant from the University of Chicago’s Defining Wisdom Project and the John Templeton Foundation.

Read the article.


Photo courtesty of Shutterstock/Alena Hovorkova.

(Something interesting I found)Posted:Sep 01 2012, 12:00 AM by brendah
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