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<?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="http://wisdomresearch.org/utility/FeedStylesheets/rss.xsl" media="screen"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/" xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"><channel><title>Search results matching tag 'bioethics'</title><link>http://wisdomresearch.org/search/SearchResults.aspx?o=DateDescending&amp;tag=bioethics&amp;orTags=0</link><description>Search results matching tag 'bioethics'</description><dc:language>en-US</dc:language><generator>CommunityServer 2007.1 (Build: 20917.1142)</generator><item><title>Clinical reasoning: new challenges</title><link>http://wisdomresearch.org/blogs/publications/archive/2009/07/01/clinical-reasoning-new-challenges.aspx</link><pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2009 05:00:00 GMT</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="false">9268a484-ff71-4fff-a623-5a1bab2e9dee:539</guid><dc:creator>wattawa</dc:creator><description>&lt;p&gt;William&amp;nbsp;E.&amp;nbsp;Stempsey&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;This article is an introduction to a special issue of &lt;i&gt;Theoretical
Medicine and Bioethics &lt;/i&gt;on clinical reasoning. Clinical reasoning
encompasses the gamut of thinking about clinical medical practice-the
evaluation and management of patients&amp;#39; medical problems. Theories of
clinical reasoning may be normative or descriptive; that is, they may
offer recommendations on how clinicians ought to think or they may
simply attempt to describe how clinicians actually do think. This
article briefly surveys these approaches in order to show the
complexity of clinical reasoning and the inadequacy of any one theory
for capturing the full richness of clinical reasoning. The authors of
this issue offer both normative and descriptive elements in their
accounts. Topics discussed include the importance for clinical
reasoning of tacit knowing, risk assessment, narrative and
hermeneutics, wisdom, and virtue epistemology.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Read &lt;a href="http://www.springerlink.com/content/p732r313t7042282/"&gt;the article. &lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Photo from &lt;a href="http://www.flickr.com/photos/minusbaby/262591726/"&gt;Flickr Creative Commons. &lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>Kass Backwards </title><link>http://wisdomresearch.org/blogs/news/archive/2009/06/02/kass-backwards.aspx</link><pubDate>Tue, 02 Jun 2009 15:28:00 GMT</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="false">9268a484-ff71-4fff-a623-5a1bab2e9dee:476</guid><dc:creator>wattawa</dc:creator><description>&lt;p&gt;By  Scott McLemee&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&amp;quot;Last week Leon Kass, chairman of the
Council of Bioethics under President Bush, took to the podium to
deliver the Jefferson Lecture of the National Endowment for the
Humanities -- an event I did not go to, though it was covered by one of
IHE&amp;#39;s &lt;a href="http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2009/05/22/kass" target="_self"&gt;intrepid reporters&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div class="attribute-bodytext"&gt;&lt;p&gt;My
reluctance to attend suggests that, without noticing it, I have come to
accept Kass’s best-known idea, “the wisdom of repugnance.” There is,
alas, all too little evidence I am getting any wiser with age -- but my
visceral aversion to hearing a Bush appointee talk about human values
is inarguable.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;        
    
      
      
                        
&lt;p&gt;As you may recall, &lt;a href="http://www.catholiceducation.org/articles/medical_ethics/me0006.html" target="_blank"&gt;Kass wrote in the late 1990s&lt;/a&gt;
that biotechnological developments such as cloning are “the emotional
expression of deep wisdom, beyond reason’s power fully to articulate
it.” In our rising gorge, he insisted, “we intuit and feel, immediately
and without argument, the violation of things that we rightfully hold
dear.... Shallow are the souls that have forgotten how to shudder...”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Read &lt;a href="http://www.insidehighered.com/views/mclemee/mclemee243"&gt;the article&lt;/a&gt; from &lt;i&gt;Inside Higher Ed&lt;/i&gt;. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>Psychology and Medical Decision-Making</title><link>http://wisdomresearch.org/blogs/publications/archive/2009/06/01/psychology-and-medical-decision-making.aspx</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2009 05:00:00 GMT</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="false">9268a484-ff71-4fff-a623-5a1bab2e9dee:500</guid><dc:creator>wattawa</dc:creator><description>&lt;p&gt;Christopher Suhler and Patricia Churchland&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&amp;quot;In the target article discussion of the &lt;i&gt;Changing Ethical Norms&lt;/i&gt; category, &lt;a href="http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a911993479&amp;amp;fulltext=713240928#CIT0002"&gt;Kon (2009)&lt;/a&gt;
rightly highlights the contributions psychological research can make to
bioethics. In this commentary, we suggest that psychology can be
relevant not only at the Changing Ethical Norms level of work, but also
at the &lt;i&gt;Ideal versus Reality&lt;/i&gt; and &lt;i&gt;Improving Care&lt;/i&gt; levels.
Thus, our aim is not to suggest potential criticisms or refinements of
Kon&amp;#39;s proposed framework, but rather to elaborate on the potential
contributions of one particular domain of empirical research,
psychology. We provide two examples of research relevant to the sorts
of decisions encountered in the medical context: findings concerning 1)
probabilistic reasoning and 2) framing effects. We then conclude by
sketching the broader bioethical implications of such findings...&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Read&lt;a href="http://www.bioethics.net/journal/"&gt; the article. &lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>Empirical Ethics as Dialogical Practice</title><link>http://wisdomresearch.org/blogs/publications/archive/2009/04/01/empirical-ethics-as-dialogical-practice.aspx</link><pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2009 05:00:00 GMT</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="false">9268a484-ff71-4fff-a623-5a1bab2e9dee:422</guid><dc:creator>wattawa</dc:creator><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://apps.isiknowledge.com/OneClickSearch.do?product=UA&amp;amp;search_mode=OneClickSearch&amp;amp;db_id=&amp;amp;SID=1D3blkPj8oidpoak5B7&amp;amp;field=AU&amp;amp;value=Widdershoven,%20G&amp;amp;ut=000264635900005&amp;amp;pos=1"&gt;Widdershoven, G&lt;/a&gt; (Widdershoven, Guy), &lt;a href="http://apps.isiknowledge.com/OneClickSearch.do?product=UA&amp;amp;search_mode=OneClickSearch&amp;amp;db_id=&amp;amp;SID=1D3blkPj8oidpoak5B7&amp;amp;field=AU&amp;amp;value=Abma,%20T&amp;amp;ut=000264635900005&amp;amp;pos=2"&gt;Abma, T&lt;/a&gt; (Abma, Tineke), &lt;a href="http://apps.isiknowledge.com/OneClickSearch.do?product=UA&amp;amp;search_mode=OneClickSearch&amp;amp;db_id=&amp;amp;SID=1D3blkPj8oidpoak5B7&amp;amp;field=AU&amp;amp;value=Molewijk,%20B&amp;amp;ut=000264635900005&amp;amp;pos=3"&gt;Molewijk, B&lt;/a&gt; (Molewijk, Bert) &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span class="FR_label"&gt;Abstract:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/b&gt;In this article, we present a
dialogical approach to empirical ethics, based upon hermeneutic ethics
and responsive evaluation. Hermeneutic ethics regards experience as the
concrete source of moral wisdom. In order to gain a good understanding
of moral issues, concrete detailed experiences and perspectives need to
be exchanged. Within hermeneutic ethics dialogue is seen as a vehicle
for moral learning and developing normative conclusions. Dialogue
stands for a specific view on moral epistemology and methodological
criteria for moral inquiry. Responsive evaluation involves a structured
way of setting up dialogical learning processes, by eliciting stories
of participants, exchanging experiences in (homogeneous and
heterogeneous) groups and drawing normative conclusions for practice.
By combining these traditions we develop both a theoretical and a
practical approach to empirical ethics, in which ethical issues are
addressed and shaped together with stakeholders in practice.
Stakeholders&amp;#39; experiences are not only used as a source for reflection
by the ethicist; stakeholders are involved in the process of reflection
and analysis, which takes place in a dialogue between participants in
practice, facilitated by the ethicist. This dialogical approach to
empirical ethics may give rise to questions such as: What contribution
does the ethicist make? What role does ethical theory play? What is the
relationship between empirical research and ethical theory in the
dialogical process? In this article, these questions will be addressed
by reflecting upon a project in empirical ethics that was set up in a
dialogical way. The aim of this project was to develop and implement
normative guidelines with and within practice, in order to improve the
practice concerning coercion and compulsion in psychiatry.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Read the &lt;a href="http://www3.interscience.wiley.com.proxy.uchicago.edu/journal/118486360/home?CRETRY=1&amp;amp;SRETRY=0"&gt;article&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>